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Abstract 
 
This paper studies the link between owner-occupied housing and household portfolio choice. 
The work follows the results by Flavin and Yamashita (American Economic Review, 92 
(2002) 345–362.) who show that the home-owning decision and exposure to house price risk 
may have a dramatic effect on the mean-variance efficient financial portfolio available to the 
household. This suggests, that we should observe that homeowners with high house values 
compared to net wealth hold their liquid financial wealth in a safer form than other 
homeowners. Using a simulation model with Finnish asset return data we find that a 
leveraged position on housing has a clear negative effect on the share of stocks in a mean-
variance efficient portfolio. The paper tests this prediction using the 1998 Wealth Survey, a 
household level data set produced by Statistics Finland. According to econometric results, 
owner-occupied housing has two effects on household stockholding. First, housing capital 
simply pushes some homeowners away from the stock market altogether because these 
households do not see it worthwhile to enter the stock market given their low level of liquid 
financial wealth and possible entry and participation costs. Second, homeowners with a 
leveraged position on housing hedge themselves against house price risk by holding less 
stocks than households who own their homes outright. 
 
Keywords: Portfolio choice, owner-occupied housing 
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1   Introduction 
 
Housing services are a necessity and a major component of household consumption 
expenditures. For example, Englund et al. (2002) report that a household living in Western 
Europe or in North America spends on average 25 to 35 percent of its income on housing. In 
addition to a consumption motive, households take into account investment aspects when 
choosing their housing tenure, the quantity of housing services they wish to consume, and the 
size of mortgage debt they wish to service. In fact, housing is also by far the largest individual 
component in households’ portfolios. Statistics Finland report that in 1998 residential housing 
constituted 66 percent of Finnish households’ overall gross wealth.1 The strongly unbalanced 
portfolios induced by investment in owner-occupied housing are illustrated in Table 1 which 
depicts the house value-to-net wealth ratios by age category in different countries. Despite 
temporal and institutional differences the life-cycle patterns are strikingly similar, especially 
in Finland and Sweden. Young homeowners with mortgage financed homes hold portfolios 
that are highly tilted toward housing capital and even middle-aged households invest almost 
100 percent of their net wealth into housing. At the same time, only about 15 percent of 
Finnish households participated in the stock market and the share of liquid financial wealth 
invested in stocks was only about 25 percent. 
 
Table 1. Mean house value relative to mean net wealth by age category. 
Age of head Finland 1998 U.S. 1989 Sweden 1991 France 1998
18 - 30  (25 - 34) 2.295 3.511 2.580 1.348
1.516 2.366 1.617 1.026
1.016 1.588 1.211 0.753
0.871 0.969 0.946 0.629
0.716 0.757 0.787 0.567
71 +  (75 +) 0.789 0.648 0.806 0.422
e: Age intervals in the parentheses refer to Sweden.
ources: Flavin and Yamashita (2002), Englund et al. (2002), LeBlanc and Lagarenne (2004)
and author's calculations from the 1998 Wealth Survey.
31 - 40  (35 - 44)
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61 - 70  (65 - 74)
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A natural question that arises in light of these figures is whether such a high portfolio share of 
housing is optimal from portfolio diversification point of view, or whether it’s driven by 
institutional constraints that prevent households from separately choosing the level of housing 
consumption and investment. Henderson and Ioannides (1983) introduce a basic theoretical 
                                                 
1 If summer cottages and other holiday residences are included the percentage share rises to 75 percent.  
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model that allows one to simplify these questions. In their model, a housing consumption 
motive introduces a lower bound for housing investment for homeowners. This means that a 
homeowner cannot own only a fraction of the house it resides in. If a homeowner’s housing 
consumption demand is equal or larger than investment demand, consumption and investment 
decisions are no longer separable.2  
 
Brueckner (1997) connects the Henderson and Ioannides model into a mean-variance 
portfolio decision framework. He shows that when the housing constraint is binding for 
homeowners, i.e. consumption demand is equal or larger than investment demand, 
homeowners’ investment portfolios are no longer efficient in a mean-variance sense. In other 
words, homeowners could attain a larger expected return on their portfolios without 
increasing its variance by adjusting their housing investment. However, homeowners are 
prevented from doing so because their housing investment is constrained by consumption 
demand. Thus, homeowners tolerate inefficiency in their portfolios because adjusting the 
level of housing investment would create utility losses by lowering the amount of housing 
services consumed.3 Flavin and Yamashita (2002) show, using historical asset returns data in 
the U.S. and plausible assumptions about the degree of household risk aversion, that house 
value-to-net wealth ratio has a dramatic effect on the share of risky financial assets in a 
household’s mean-variance efficient portfolio. In their model, the house value-to-net wealth 
ratio acts as constraint on the mean-variance efficient financial portfolio attainable to a 
homeowner. In effect, a leveraged position in a volatile asset exposes homeowner households 
to a background risk that has an adverse effect on their desire to take additional risks in their 
financial portfolio choice.  
 
In Finland homeownership is preferable to renting for a number of reasons (tax subsidies, 
agency and externality cost of rental housing etc.), which is why a majority of Finnish 
households choose to own a home, at least at some point during their life-cycle.4 Due to 
current institutional arrangements in Finland, homeowners are often unable to separate their 
                                                 
2 Of course, if consumption demand is sufficiently higher than investment demand a household may choose to 
rent. See Ioannides and Rosenthal (1994) for details. 
3 We can also think of homeowners as consuming less than the optimal amount of housing services because 
consuming more would lead to a more inefficient portfolio. 
4 Promotion of homeownership is actually one of the most important goals of Finnish housing policy. 
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housing consumption and investment choices.5 Thus, a binding housing constraint may be a 
major factor driving the financial portfolio choices of many Finnish households. Furthermore, 
because the share of housing of overall net wealth changes during a typical life-cycle, housing 
may introduce a clear life-cycle pattern in household financial portfolios that is not predicted 
by simpler portfolio models. From the above argumentation it is clear that any empirical 
attempt to determine what factors drive households’ financial portfolio choices should take 
housing directly into account. 
 
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we employ a simulation approach similar to Flavin 
and Yamashita (2002) to study how a leveraged position on housing affects a homeowner’s 
optimal portfolio choice under current investment environment in Finland. The main 
contribution, though, is to test the predictions from the simulation model using micro data of 
Finnish households. Simulation results show that a leveraged position on housing has a clear 
negative effect on the share of stocks in an optimal portfolio. This effect is amplified for more 
risk-averse households. Econometric results support the simulation results. According to 
them, owner-occupied housing has two effects on household stockholding. First, housing 
capital simply pushes some homeowners away from the stock market altogether because these 
households do not see it worthwhile to enter the stock market given their low level of liquid 
financial wealth and possible entry and participation costs. Second, homeowners with a 
leveraged position on housing hedge themselves against house price risk by holding less 
stocks than households who own their homes outright. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the model by Flavin and 
Yamashita (2002) where owner-occupied housing is introduced into mean-variance portfolio 
framework. Then we solve the model numerically using Finnish asset return data. This gives 
us the optimal investment in stocks as a function of house value-to-net-wealth ratio and risk 
aversion. In section 3, we take the predictions from the numerical model to household level 
data using econometric models for discrete and limited dependent variables. Section 4 
concludes. 
 
                                                 
5 Some new tenure forms have been introduced in the last 15 years which combine characteristics of both renting 
and owning, such as the right of occupancy. But these tenure forms consist to less than a percent of the housing 
stock in Finland. 
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2   Housing in a mean-variance portfolio framework 
2.1. Theoretical model 
 
In this section, we use the model first introduced by Flavin and Yamashita (2002) to study 
how owner-occupied housing affects household portfolio choice. The model can be used to 
simulate what the optimal portfolio shares should be in theory for a homeowner household 
with a leveraged position in housing using data on historical asset returns. In the model, 
owner-occupied housing and mortgage debt are introduced as part of a homeowner’s portfolio 
problem in an otherwise traditional mean-variance framework. The model abstracts from the 
tenure choice problem by assuming that homeownership is the preferred tenure due to tax 
distortions, and transaction and agency costs related to renting. A homeowner’s total net 
wealth at time t is given by 
 
 ,     (1) t t tW P′= +X I tH
 
where Xt is a (1 x n) vector of amounts held in i = 1,…, n risky assets, I is vector of ones, Ht 
the quantity of housing and Pt the unit price of housing. The last element in Xt represents 
mortgage holding. The constraints on financial asset holdings are 
 
     (2) , 0,t t n tPH X− ≤ ≤
     (3) , 0,     1,..., 1.i tX i n≥ = −
 
Constraint in (2), the mortgage constraint, states that the household can borrow only up to 
house value and cannot be a mortgage lender. Constraint (3) requires non-negative financial 
asset holdings. Thus, the household can only borrow through a mortgage debt. The asset 
returns are random and are decomposed into the expected return and a stochastic component 
as follows: , ,i t i i tR µ ε= +  and , , ,H t H HR tµ ε= +  with ,i t iE R µ⎡ ⎤ =⎣ ⎦  and , .H tE R Hµ⎡ ⎤ =⎣ ⎦ The 
covariance matrix of the returns is given by 
 
 [ ],t tE ′=Ω ε ε      (4) 
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where  The vector of expected returns on financial assets is defined as 
 Now a household’s optimization problem can be expressed in terms of 
choosing asset shares x
( 1, , ,,..., , .t t n t H tε ε ε ′≡ε )
)( 1,..., .n ′≡µ µ µ
t:6
 
( ) [ ] [ ]max , ,
2t t t H t t t t
Ah hµ⎧ ′′ + −⎨⎩ ⎭x x µ x Ω x h
⎫⎬   (5) 
  ,
,
s.t.  1 ,
     0,
      0,    1,..., 1,
t t
t n t
i t
h
h x
x i n
′= +
− ≤ ≤
≥ = −
x I
 
where     and   .t t tt t
t t
PHh
W W
≡ ≡ Xx  
 
The idea is that the household maximizes expected utility of wealth with respect to holdings 
of financial assets conditional on the current value of ht. Household’s risk preferences are 
represented by the coefficient of relative risk aversion, A. Thus, for a given value of ht, the 
mean-variance efficient frontier available to the household can be calculated by finding the 
value of xt which achieves the minimum variance portfolio for a given expected return. The 
chosen optimal portfolio from these frontiers naturally depends on risk aversion. We stress 
that the solution is conditional on housing investment, ht. Once a home-owning household 
commits itself to a particular level of housing consumption, the optimal adjustment interval 
may be very long because of adjustment costs.7 Arguably, the costs of adjusting the quantities 
of financial assets are smaller.  
 
2.2   Optimal portfolios using Finnish asset return data 
 
Following Flavin and Yamashita (2002) we estimate ,tµ Hµ  and  using historical data on 
asset and housing returns and solve the optimization problem in (5) for different values of h 
Ω
                                                 
6 This formulation of the objective function is based on the assumptions that asset returns are normally 
distributed and the utility function is of the constant relative or absolute risk aversion (CRRA or CARA) form. 
See Flavin and Yamashita (1998) for details. 
7 See e.g. Grossman and Laroque (1990). 
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and A.8 Mean-variance optimal portfolios associated with (5) are calculated using Finnish 
quarterly asset return data on five broad asset classes from 1995 to 2005. Eleven years is a 
rather short period, especially when considering homebuyers investment horizons. However, 
data on government bond returns are not available prior to 1995. The upshot of this period is 
that major institutional reforms took place in the early and mid 1990s. Most notably, a major 
tax reform was implemented in 1993, rent controls were phased out on private rental 
dwellings during 1992–1995, and Finland joined the EU in 1995 and EMU in 2001. The last 
mentioned have meant a period of low inflation and nominal interest rates. Furthermore, from 
1993 onwards foreign investors have been allowed to freely invest in Finnish securities.9 
Using data from before 1995 would not give a true picture of the current investment 
opportunities available to households and the linkages between different asset returns. 
 
Table 2 reports quarterly mean asset returns, standard deviations, and the respective 
correlation matrix for the assets.10 The real after-tax quarterly returns from different assets 
range from 0.21 percent from bank accounts to 2.29 percent from owner-occupied housing. 
Housing investment has been very profitable in Finland during the period. Houses have even 
outperformed stocks: they show a higher mean return and a lower standard deviation. 
Furthermore, housing returns are negatively correlated with other assets except stocks. 
Compared to other countries, housing offers high returns in Finland.11 The results are most 
comparable to the ones found by Iacoviello and Ortalo-Magné (2003) with U.K. data except 
that in Finland housing and bond returns have a negative correlation as opposed to a positive 
one in the U.K. This may be because our data on bond returns include short maturities, which 
are found to have a negative correlation with housing returns in the U.K. Flavin and 
Yamashita (2002) find negative but insignificantly small correlations between housing and all 
financial asset returns in the U.S. Of course, some of the differences may be driven by 
different investment horizons. 
 
 
                                                 
8 Flavin and Yamashita use government T-bills, government bonds, stocks along with mortgage and housing. Le 
Blanc and Lagarenne (2004) do similar calculations using French data.  
9 Oikarinen (2006) finds evidence of a structural break in the long-run relationship between stock and house 
prices in Finland at beginning of 1993. He concludes that this was probably due to the abolition of foreign 
ownership restrictions in the stock market. 
10 The calculation of asset returns is described in Appendix 1. 
11 See Iacoviello and Ortalo-Magné (2003) for further discussion on country differences. 
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Bank account Bonds Stocks Mortgage House
Return 0.0021 0.0106 0.0207 0.0083 0.0229
d. 0.0016 0.0151 0.0860 0.0030 0.0190
rrelation matrix
Bank account Bonds Stocks Mortgage House
Bank account 1.0000
onds 0.7263 1.0000
ocks 0.0338 -0.1954 1.0000
rtgage 0.8528 0.6420 -0.0214 1.0000
ouse -0.2263 -0.2208 0.3689 -0.2317 1.0000
s.
Co
B
St
Mo
H
  
Table 2. Mean quarterly returns and correlation matrix of assets, 1995–2005. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 reports the simulated optimal portfolios for different levels of h and A using the 
returns and the correlation matrix reported in Table 2. The values of h correspond to the age 
group averages in Table 1. With low levels of risk aversion (A = 1) the optimal portfolio 
consist of only stocks, regardless of the housing constraint. However, with higher levels of 
risk aversion the share of stocks declines as the household replaces stocks with bonds. 
Interestingly, even at very high levels of risk aversion bank accounts are not included in the 
optimal portfolio.12 This is true even when the housing constraint is introduced. With 
moderate and high levels of risk aversion (  the optimal share of stocks depends on the 
housing constraint, with higher values of h being associated with lower shares of stocks. 
Furthermore, at very high levels of risk aversion and house value it is optimal for a 
homeowner not to hold stocks. The value -1 for mortgage means that the house is fully 
mortgaged, i.e. the amount of mortgage debt equals house value. These results are in line with 
the results obtained by Flavin and Yamashita (2002) using U.S. data.  
2)A ≥ ,
                                                
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 Of course in reality, money is kept in bank accounts due to liquidity and possibly buffer-stock considerations. 
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Table 3. Optimal portfolio shares with different values of h. 
House value-to-net 
wealth ratio Assets Degree of risk aversion
A = 1 A = 2 A = 4 A = 8 A = 10
295 Bank account 0 0 0 0 0
Bonds 0 0.5088 0.8217 0.9782 1
Stocks 1 0.4912 0.1783 0.0218 0
Mortgage -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
516 Bank account 0 0 0 0 0
Bonds 0 0.4432 0.7561 0.9126 0.9439
Stocks 1 0.5568 0.2439 0.0874 0.0561
Mortgage -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
h = 1.016 Bank account 0 0 0 0 0
Bonds 0 0.4011 0.7140 0.8705 0.9018
Stocks 1 0.5989 0.2860 0.1295 0.0982
Mortgage -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
871 Bank account 0 0 0 0 0
Bonds 0 0.3889 0.7018 0.8583 0.8896
Stocks 1 0.6111 0.2982 0.1417 0.1104
Mortgage -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
h = 0.716 Bank account 0 0 0 0 0
Bonds 0 0.3758 0.6888 0.8453 0.8766
Stocks 1 0.6242 0.3112 0.1547 0.1234
Mortgage -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
789 Bank account 0 0 0 0 0
Bonds 0 0.3820 0.6949 0.8514 0.8827
Stocks 1 0.6180 0.3051 0.1486 0.1173
Mortgage -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
h = 2.
h = 1.
h = 0.
h = 0.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Table 3 the decreasing investment into stock markets is driven by the household’s desire to 
hedge against house price risk. However, if there are entry or participation costs to stock 
markets housing investment may, in effect, crowd-out investment in stocks. In other words, if 
the house takes a sufficiently large share of overall wealth, it may be optimal for the 
household not to participate in the stock market, simply because the gain from doing so does 
not exceed the costs. Empirical evidence suggests that surprisingly small participation costs 
are sufficient to deter households from participating in the stock market.13 We will return to 
this in the econometric part. Furthermore, for homeowners who are expecting to move up the 
housing ladder in the future, it may optimal to accumulate housing wealth because it works as 
an insurance against house price risk. This is true especially if the household is expecting to 
move within the same housing market where house prices are highly correlated. This aspect is 
                                                 
13Vissing-Jorgenson (2002) finds that a mere cost of 50 dollars a year (in 2000 prices) was enough to explain the 
nonparticipation of half of the nonparticipants in the U.S. in 1994. 260 dollars was enough to explain the 
behavior of 75 percent of nonparticipants. This reflects the fact that nonparticipants had very little financial 
wealth to invest in the first place. 
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emphasized by Sinai and Souleles (2005). Thus, it may not be optimal for a young 
homeowner to invest in the stock market even if house price and stock market risks are un- or 
negatively correlated.  
 
3   Econometric analysis 
3.1   Data description 
 
In the econometric analyses we use data from the 1998 Wealth Survey conducted by Statistics 
Finland. Along with portfolio information, the Wealth Survey includes information on various 
household characteristics such as socio-economic status, demographics, income, taxes, 
housing and wealth. Part of the information in the survey is collected from various 
administrative registers. The amounts of various assets are collected through interviews. The 
sample is a stratified sample drawn from all private households in Finland where the strata are 
created according to socio-economic status and income. For practical reasons, entrepreneurs 
and high-income households are assigned a higher inclusion probability to the final sample. 
The selected households are given sampling weights so that the sample can be made 
representative of the whole population. The weights are the inverses of inclusion probabilities 
to the sample and are included in the data sets. We start the empirical analysis by reporting 
some descriptive statistics. Table 4 presents the percentage of households owning particular 
assets and liabilities, and the asset shares of total wealth classified by household net wealth 
and age. All the results, including the construction of the percentiles, are weighted using the 
sampling weights.  
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Table 4. Asset ownership by wealth quartiles and age in Finland, 1998. 
Net wealth quartile
All I II III IV top 5 %
Percentage holding the asset
L
M
isted stocks 14.9 2.6 9.8 11.5 35.7 56.6
utual funds 3.4 1.6 0.9 1.8 9.3 16.8
onds 2.6 0.6 1.1 1.4 7.0 12.1
Owner-occupied dwelling 63.7 4.4 56.0 95.2 99.3 98.6
ortgage 28.3 8.6 35.1 38.5 31.1 28.5
Percentage of total financial assets
isted stocks 19.5 2.4 8.1 5.0 24.2 33.9
utual funds 2.9 0.4 0.8 1.4 4.2 5.0
  Bonds 2.6 1.3 0.4 0.7 3.3 2.8
Percentage of total gross assets
ner-occupied dwelling 59.2 42.4 66.0 73.3 53.0 42.5
ortgage 10.0 82.3 31.0 11.9 4.2 2.6
Average holdings
Average total net wealth, € 86 865 1 292 28 062 83 059 239 473 501 749
verage stockholding, € 17 298 1 961 4 637 4 471 28 801 79 473
verage house value, € 92 166 45 540 52 004 73 964 134 395 223 112
verage mortgage, € 34 873 45 285 38 990 29 772 33 637 47 690
Age group
Under 25 25 - 34 35 - 44 45 - 54 55 - 64 Over 64
Percentage holding the asset
isted stocks 10.6 11.6 14.9 19.9 18.0 12.1
utual funds 2.4 3.6 3.0 4.1 4.2 2.9
onds 1.5 1.7 2.3 1.8 3.9 3.7
Owner-occupied dwelling 11.3 39.4 66.5 77.6 81.9 72.6
ortgage 10.7 36.2 49.3 37.5 19.3 5.2
Percentage of total financial assets
isted stocks 8.8 18.4 17.3 18.5 21.7 21.5
utual funds 3.1 1.0 3.6 2.6 6.9 1.8
onds 2.6 0.4 2.7 3.3 2.3 2.9
Percentage of total gross assets
ner-occupied dwelling 46.3 61.3 66.8 58.8 53.1 57.9
ortgage 25.5 28.1 20.0 7.6 3.2 0.6
Average holdings
verage total net wealth, € 15 363 51 260 90 387 123 419 141 556 104 261
verage stockholding, € 4 254 10 662 13 857 16 071 25 238 22 075
verage house value, € 68 876 88 834 102 982 96 333 91 734 81 428
verage mortgage, € 39 894 44 381 41 586 25 838 23 148 12 392
es: House refers to the households primary dwelling. Average holdings are 
calculated conditional on ownership. Sampling weigths are used in the calculations.
ource: Author's calculations from the 1998 Wealth Survey.
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About 15 percent of Finnish households have direct stock investments. Households’ 
participation in the stock market (both directly and trough mutual funds) clearly increases 
with household wealth level. The same is true for bond ownership indicating that wealthier 
households have more complete portfolios. Similar pattern is evident in the share of financial 
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wealth invested in stocks. Furthermore, households in the top half of the wealth distribution 
are almost exclusively homeowners. Interestingly, wealthy households also hold significant 
amounts of mortgage debt. This seems to indicate that mortgage debt is used for portfolio 
balancing purposes. In other words, financially sophisticated households understand that 
paying down the mortgage may not be the ideal investment strategy, but instead it may be 
optimal to invest in stocks and enjoy arbitrage returns. This opportunity is enhanced by the 
deductibility of mortgage interest in taxation and is more attractive for wealthy households for 
whom a leveraged position in housing does not necessarily induce a highly risky position. 
 
Stock ownership follows a hump-shaped age pattern peaking after the age of 45 and dropping 
again after retirement. However, once a household owns stocks there is no clear age pattern in 
the share of financial wealth invested in stocks. Similar, although stronger, age pattern is 
evident with homeownership peaking a little later than stock ownership. The figures in Table 
4 also give some indication that the age pattern of housing and mortgage choices does not 
exclusively coincide with the age pattern of stockholding the way the simulation model 
predicts. Thus, either age has a direct effect on stockholding or age is correlated with 
something that is not accounted for in these simple calculations.14
 
3.2   Previous studies 
 
Next we investigate whether the observed pattern of optimal portfolios depicted in Table 3 
actually holds among Finnish households. We review first the main empirical literature on 
this issue. Table 5 summarizes the most relevant studies regarding our undertaking, 
highlighting the most important econometric problems that arise in this setting. The main 
problem is the possible endogeneity of the key explanatory variables. Thus, instrumental 
variable techniques are needed. The second problem involves sample selection issues and/or 
censoring because most households hold zero amounts of stocks. These problems arise, for 
example, if stock market participation involves entry costs that prohibit some households 
from participating. Thus, we only observe positive holdings for households whose optimal 
investment is higher than the entry threshold.  
 
                                                 
14 See Jagannathan and Kocherlakota (1996) for a lucid presentation on how age can affect household 
stockholdings. 
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All but one of the papers listed in Table 5 use U.S. data.15 The papers most similar to ours are 
Fratantoni (1998), Yamashita (2003), Kullman and Siegel (2004), and Yao and Zhang (2005). 
Fratantoni (1998) investigates how homeownership and especially the committed 
expenditures related to it, namely mortgage interest and repayment, affect households’ 
investment in risky assets. Fratantoni (1998) argues that besides the house price risk a home-
owning household is exposed to a risk related to committed long term housing-related 
expenditures, such as mortgage expenses. This is because a home-owning household with a 
mortgage debt commits itself to making payments out of its uncertain labor income stream for 
an extended period of time. The failure to meet these payments may cause high costs in form 
of moving, for example. Fratantoni (1998) finds empirical evidence using U.S. data from the 
1989 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) that households with a high mortgage expenses-to-
income ratio tend to hold a smaller share of their financial wealth in the form of risky assets. 
Yamashita (2003) also uses the 1989 cross-section of the SCF and finds evidence that house 
value-to-net wealth ratio (h in Section 3) has a negative effect on the share of risky assets of 
all financial assets after controlling for income, age, family size, education, and a proxy for 
risk  aversion. However, Yamashita (2003) does not control for net wealth level, so the results 
are difficult to interpret.16
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 The reader can find empirical studies on stockholding in general in a variety of European countries in Guiso et 
al. (2003).  
16 By not directly including net wealth level Yamashita (2003) implicitly assumes that housing wealth and net 
wealth have opposite effects on stockholding. Since it is a well-established empirical regularity that wealthier 
households hold more stocks, Yamashita’s negative sign on the housing variable may be driven by this. 
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Paper Dependent variables
Housing related RHS 
variables
Wealth variable 
controlled Data set and type Model type
Instruments for housing 
variables
Fratantoni (1998) risky assets / financial 
wealth,                            
stocks / financial wealth
total mortgage payment / 
income,  primary mortgage 
payment / income,                 
rent / income, predicted 
homeownership status
total net wealth, 
total financial 
wealth
Survey of Consumer 
Finances (US), 1989
Heckman sample 
selection
number of credit cards 
(used as an instrument for 
mortgage payments)
Heaton and Lucas 
(2000b)
stocks / liquid wealth, 
stocks / financial wealth, 
stocks / total net wealth, 
amount of stocks ($)
house value / net wealth, 
mortgage / net wealth, house 
value, mortgage balance
total financial  
wealth
Survey of Consumer 
Finances (US), 1992; 
Panel of Individual Tax 
Return Data (US), 
1979–1990, panel
linear regression 
conditional on 
participation
none
Hochguertel and 
van Soest (2001)
housing wealth, financial 
wealth, gross and net 
none none Ducth collective Bank 
Study, 1988
cencored bivariate 
regression
none
Yamashita (2003) stocks / financial wealth house value / net wealth, 
mortgage payments / income
none Survey of Consumer 
Finances (US), 1989
Heckman sample 
selection
age, family size, home 
tenure in years,  housing 
return during tenure
Kullman and Siegel 
(2004)
participation,                 
stocks / financial wealth
house value / net wealth,         
mortgage / net wealth, other 
real estate / net wealth
total net wealth Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (US), 
1984–1999, panel
dynamic probit, 
sample selection 
with panel data
in first difference models 
past levels of RHS are 
used as instruments
Yao and Zhang 
(2005)
participation,                     
stocks / financial wealth, 
stocks / total net wealth
house value / net wealth,         
mortgage / net wealth
total net wealth Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (US), 
1984–2001, panel
conditional logit, 
sample selection 
with panel data
none
Chetty and Szeidl 
(2005)
amount of stocks ($),           
stocks / total net wealth
home tenure (years), regional 
house price variation
total net wealth, 
spline
Survey of Income and 
Survey Participation 
(US), 1990–1996, panel
linear 2SLS, no 
sample selection 
correction
age at first marriage, age at 
first marriage termination, 
remarriage
Shum and Faig 
(2006)
participation,                     
stocks / financial wealth
house value / net wealth,         
investment real estate / net 
wealth
total financial 
wealth
Survey of Consumer 
Finances (US), 
1992–2001, repeated 
cross-sections
probit, tobit, linear 
regression 
conditional on 
participation
none
         Table 5. Summary of previous studies.  
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Yao and Zhang (2005) use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and find that a higher 
house-value-to-net wealth ratio is associated with lower participation in financial markets and 
with a lower wealth share of stocks. They also use mortgage debt-to-net wealth ratio as an 
explanatory variable and find that it has a positive effect on the demand for risky assets. 
Kullman and Siegel (2004) also use the PSID data and find that homeowners are more likely 
to participate in the stock market than renters. Among homeowners, higher levels of housing 
investment decreases the share of financial assets invested in stocks, whereas again higher 
mortgage holdings relative to net wealth increase the share. Kullman and Siegel also find that 
controlling for unobserved, time-invariant, household heterogeneity significantly increases the 
negative effect of house value-to-net wealth ratio.  
 
Heaton and Lucas (2000) concentrate on entrepreneurial background risk but also control for 
real estate investments. They find that households with a large share of their wealth invested 
in real estate tend to hold smaller shares of their financial wealth in stocks. Chetty and Szeidl 
(2005) test a prediction from a theoretical model by Grossman and Laroque (1990). The 
Grossman and Laroque model predicts that when adjusting the level of an illiquid durable 
consumption good is costly, households are more risk averse just after the purchase of a 
durable. Chetty and Szeidl test this prediction by regressing the amount of stocks (in dollars) 
held by a homeowner household to home tenure length. Because home tenure may be 
endogenously determined they instrument it using marital shocks as instruments.17 They find 
that homeowners’ stock holding increases with longer tenure. However, as home tenure 
increases the portfolio share of housing usually decreases when households accumulate more 
financial wealth. Thus, one would expect a high negative correlation between the length of 
housing tenure and house value-to-net wealth ratio which was also suggested by the age-
pattern in Table 1. 
 
Shum and Faig (2006) study what factors explain the stock market participation decision and 
the share of stocks of household financial wealth. They control for housing investment using 
two variables. The first is the value of a household’s primary residence relative to total net 
wealth, and the other, the value of investment real estate relative to total net wealth. 
Interestingly, the housing variables are statistically insignificant both in the extensive and 
                                                 
17 More precisely, they use age at first marriage, age at first marriage termination and an indicator variable for 
remarriage as their instruments. In our opinion, this is by far the most credible instrumental variables approach 
used in the papers cited here. 
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intensive margins in all of their model specifications. Shum and Faig do not use instrumental 
variables techniques. The SCF data sets that they use also includes information on the saving 
motives of households. Using this information Shum and Faig construct dummy variables that 
indicate whether a particular saving motive is in the top three of most important motives. 
Saving for the purpose of investing in own home had a negative and statistically significant 
effect on the share of financial wealth invested in stocks but not on participation.  
 
The paper by Hochguertel and van Soest (2001) differs considerably from the other papers in 
Table 5. Although they do not explicitly model household investment in risky assets as a 
function of housing choices, they do find some interesting patterns. Hochguertel and van 
Soest are more concerned with the spillover effects that housing investment may have on the 
demand for financial assets and vice versa. They find that demand for financial wealth is 
systematically different for renters and homeowners among Dutch households. Furthermore, 
they find evidence that investing in financial wealth involves a positive threshold which has to 
be overcome before positive financial asset holdings are possible. Moreover, this threshold is 
magnified by the level of housing investment. This finding is in line with the assumption of 
entry and participation costs and that housing investment crowds out financial investment. 
 
3.3   Estimation results 
 
We follow the basic guidelines from previous econometric research on household portfolio 
choice and model both the participation decision (the extensive margin) and the share of 
financial assets households hold in stocks (the intensive margin). We concentrate on 
homeowners and discard the possible sample selection problems associated with dropping 
renter households from the sample. The variable of interest in the numerical simulation model 
was house value-to-net wealth ratio. However, in the econometric models we will use the 
levels of house value and mortgage debt as our key explanatory variables because a major 
multicollinearity problem was found when we used these variables divided by net wealth.18 
This choice of variables should not have a major effect on the results since we are directly 
controlling for net wealth. The house value variable is estimated by the homeowner. This, of 
course, is a biased estimate of the true market value of the house. However, this variable is 
                                                 
18 The correlation coefficient for these variables in the sample of homeowners was 0.96. The correlation for the 
level variables was only 0.26. 
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exactly what we are interested in because the portfolio choices of homeowners are based on 
their own evaluation of their situation, including the value of their house.19
 
We made some further restrictions on the sample of households we are studying. First, since 
we are interested in portfolio choice we include only households who have sufficient funds to 
form a reasonable portfolio. We exclude households with financial wealth smaller than 
€1,000. We also exclude households with a negative overall net wealth and annual income 
smaller than €5,000. Furthermore, we eliminate outliers by deleting observations with a house 
value-to-net wealth ratio greater than 20,20 and mortgage expenses to income ratio greater 
than 1. This leaves us with a total sample size of 2 443 homeowners.  
 
Some comments on the explanatory variables are in order. Important determinants of portfolio 
choice are missing from our data, namely proxies for the degree of risk aversion, labor 
income uncertainty and credit constraints. Since these omitted variables are likely to be 
correlated with households’ housing choices, our key explanatory variables are possibly 
endogenous. We are forced to assume that these differences can be captured by the observable 
characteristics of the households that are included in the model or that we can recover 
consistent estimates trough instrumental variable techniques. However, since exogeneity of 
house value was not rejected in any of our instrumental variable models we present the 
estimation frameworks and results for these models in Appendix 2. Income uncertainty is 
proxied with occupation category dummies. Education variables should capture differences in 
human capital and possibly in the level of financial sophistication. Urbanization rate dummies 
are included to capture differences in access to financial services, opportunities for social 
interaction, and knowledge spill-over associated with urban environments.21
 
The results of probit models for participation are presented in Table 6. We report marginal 
effects calculated at the sample means of the other covariates. The results indicate that overall 
                                                 
19 Of course, if homeowners who have high valuations of what their house is worth also hold more positive 
expectations on how well the stock market performs, the house value may be an endogenous variable. This may 
seem far fetched. We come back to endogeneity shortly. 
20 This figure corresponds to a 95 percent mortgage loan to house value ratio. Usually banks offering mortgages 
in Finland require that the loan-to-value ratio does not exceed 80 or 85 percent when the house is bought. Of 
course, due to house price fluctuations after purchase a loan-to-value ratio exceeding 1 is possible if house prices 
deflate sufficiently.  
21 Hong at al. (2004) find evidence that social interactions play a role in stock market participation among U.S. 
households. 
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net wealth and education are important determinants of stock market participation. On the 
other hand, current income (labor and entrepreneur income) has no effect. Interestingly, age 
has no effect on stock market participation when all homeowners are included in the model.  
 
We add the housing variables of interest in steps. First, we include only house value. The 
results indicate that at a given level of net wealth, higher house value is associated with a 
lower probability of stockholding. It is important to understand what this result means. Since 
we are controlling for net wealth an increase in house value must be accompanied by a euro-
to-euro increase in mortgage debt, a decrease in financial wealth or a combination of the two 
that holds net wealth fixed.22 Next we include house value and also control for the size of the 
mortgage. In this case, we are comparing households who are similar in all other ways except 
in the composition of their financial and housing wealth. Thus, a higher house value 
automatically means a lower level of financial wealth because net wealth and mortgage debt 
are fixed. With this in mind the results tell us that increasing house value at a given level of 
net wealth and mortgage debt decreases the probability of stockholding. This result can be 
interpreted in two ways. First, households may be hedging against house price risk, a result 
that is in line with Flavin and Yamashita (2002) story and our simulation results. Second, 
since higher house value means lower financial wealth, high house value may simply indicate 
that a household’s financial wealth is lower than the costs of participating.  
 
The positive effect (although not statistically significant) of mortgage debt on stockholding 
seems surprising. However, holding net wealth and house value fixed means that a household 
with a higher mortgage has also more wealth in liquid financial form. It is tempting to 
interpret this so that households are using mortgage debt as means of portfolio diversification, 
not just for obtaining a desired level of housing services. The descriptive statistics in Table 4 
also hinted this possibility. However, these speculations should be taken cautiously because 
the marginal effect is not statistically significant.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 We assume that households do not use consumer debt for investment purposes. 
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Table 6. Probit models for stock market participation. 
Marginal Std. Marginal Std. Marginal Std. Marginal Std. 
effect error effect error effect error effect error
i
(i
ncome / 1000 0.002 0.0014 0.002 0.0014 -0.001 0.004 0.001 0.002
ncome / 1000)2 -6.8E-06 8.7E-06 -6.5E-06 8.7E-06 3.1E-05 3.9E-05 -5.4E-06 9.6E-06
 wealth / 1000 0.002** 0.0002 0.002** 0.0002 0.002** 0.0003 0.002** 0.0002
(net wealth / 1000)2 -5.5E-07** 9.3E-08 -5.5E-07** 9.3E-08 -1.0E-06** 3.0E-07 -5.7E-07** 1.1E-07
 (ref. < 25) -0.010 0.090 -0.009 0.091 -0.090 0.091 0.287 0.273
-0.086 0.079 -0.084 0.080 -0.123 0.096 0.023 0.210
-0.091 0.079 -0.087 0.080 -0.172* 0.084 0.097 0.219
-0.114 0.074 -0.110 0.075 -0.175** 0.066 0.067 0.215
   age 65– -0.086 0.085 -0.081 0.087 -0.112 0.106 0.120 0.214
ber of adults -0.023 0.018 -0.022 0.018 -0.039 0.030 -0.013 0.023
ber of children -0.016 0.011 -0.016 0.011 -0.018 0.014 -0.002 0.020
emale household head -0.049** 0.020 -0.049* 0.020 -0.096** 0.030 -0.015 0.027
ation, hh's heada
   education = 1 0.038 0.029 0.037 0.029 0.099* 0.050 -0.015 0.036
ation = 2 0.114** 0.030 0.113** 0.030 0.139** 0.049 0.093* 0.041
ation = 3 0.229** 0.049 0.229** 0.049 0.220** 0.071 0.247** 0.071
ation, others
ation = 1 -0.029 0.032 -0.028 0.032 -0.083* 0.042 0.030 0.049
   education = 2 0.074 0.047 0.075 0.047 0.017 0.057 0.168* 0.081
ation = 3 0.052 0.074 0.051 0.074 0.086 0.097 -0.006 0.117
repreneurb -0.018 0.036 -0.018 0.036 -0.065 0.046 0.013 0.058
ecutive 0.061 0.045 0.059 0.045 0.013 0.049 0.175 0.095
armer 0.116 0.059 0.119 0.059 0.136 0.112 0.101 0.071
retired -0.020 0.038 -0.020 0.038 0.144 0.094 -0.055 0.046
ong-term unemployed 0.110 0.078 0.111 0.078 0.206 0.149 0.096 0.095
   Inherited fin. wealthc 0.055* 0.026 0.055* 0.026 0.028 0.036 0.069* 0.037
mi-urband -0.050* 0.024 -0.051* 0.024 -0.110** 0.032 -0.009 0.035
-0.027 0.023 -0.027 0.023 -0.071* 0.035 0.006 0.032
house value / 1000 -0.0008* 0.0002 -0.0009** 0.0002 -0.0010** 0.0004 -0.0009** 0.0003
ortgage / 1000 0.0003 0.0005 0.0001 0.0006
tly predicted as 1
tly predicted as 0
Log-L -1 196 -1 196 -537 -640
2 443   (775) 2 443   (775) 1 065  (316) 1 378  (459)
262    (34 %) 259    (33 %) 82  (26 %) 185  (40 %)
1 545  (93 %) 1 544  (93 %) 694  (93 %) 830  (90 %)
Urbanisation rate dummy variables, reference group is urban areas.
es: The dependent variable indicates participation in the stock market either directly or trough mutual funds. 
ampling weights are used in the estimation. ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1and 5 percent level, 
pectively. 
a Dummy variables for education. Reference group is comprehensive school only. Education of other members 
akes a value of one if there are two or more persons with the particular degree in the household. 1 = high school 
ocational school, 2 = higher vocational, 3 = university degree.
Occupation type dummies, reference group is employees.
Dummy indicating that the household has inherited financial assets in the last five years.
All homeowners All homeowners Mortgage > 0 Mortgage = 0
net
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To further investigate the effect of mortgage debt, we divide the sample of homeowners into 
those who have a mortgage and to those who do not. This should give clearer evidence 
whether it is the leveraged position in owner-occupied housing that is driving the results. We 
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find no support for this claim. House value has a negative effect of similar magnitude on 
stockholding for both types of homeowners. This suggests that the result is driven primarily 
by the crowd-out effect which says that homeowners with valuable homes simply have fewer 
funds available for stock market investment than homeowners with less valuable homes and 
identical net wealth level. However, there are some other interesting differences between the 
sub-samples. First of all, age effect becomes significant for homeowners with a mortgage. 
They decrease their participation rate after reaching 45 and again increase it after retirement. 
Second, the urbanization rate dummies are much larger in absolute terms for the sample of 
mortgaged homeowners. This seems to indicate that the urbanization dummies also capture 
some effects of local housing market conditions that are not picked up by house value or 
mortgage debt, such as expectations on house price fluctuations which maybe more important 
for households with a mortgage debt. 
 
The marginal effect of house value may seem small. However, the results are also 
economically meaningful as is illustrated in Figure 1 which plots the predicted probability of 
stockholding from the probit models as a function of house value. The horizontal axis is in 
thousands of euros Predictions are calculated from models where mortgage debt is not 
controlled so the rise in house value is accompanied by an increase in mortgage debt or a 
decrease in financial wealth. Other covariates are kept at their sample means. For example, a 
one standard deviation increase in house value from the sample mean (about €95 000) 
decreases the probability of stockholding by about 8 percentage points. 
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Figure 1. Predicted probability of stockholding as a function of house value.  
 
The interpretation of the effect of total net wealth is interesting as well. When we control for 
house value and the size of mortgage debt, changes in net wealth are actually changes in 
financial wealth. In this case, the positive effect of net wealth can be interpreted in two ways. 
First, as financial wealth increases households are more likely to be able to overcome any 
fixed participation costs involved with entering the stock market. Second, this result suggests 
that households (or at least homeowners) become less risk averse as they gain more wealth.  
 
A final note on the probit models is that we are not really doing a good job in explaining the 
participation of homeowners to stock markets. Although good and intuitive fit measures for 
discrete choice models do not exist, the percentage of homeowners we are able to correctly 
predict as stockholders gives us some indication of model performance.23 According to this 
measure, we can explain the stock market participation decision by homeowners without a 
mortgage much better than the behavior of homeowners with a mortgage. This is not 
surprising because homeowners without a mortgage are typically older households probably 
with less overall uncertainty in their current situation.  
                                                 
23 A homeowner is predicted as a stockholder if the predicted probability is 0.5 or higher. 
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Next we turn to explaining the share of liquid financial wealth invested in stocks or mutual 
funds.24 As our first specification, we use the tobit model for censored dependent variables. 
However, the tobit model may be inflexible because it assumes that same factors affect the 
participation and the share of stocks in the portfolio the same way. Furthermore, it is unclear 
whether the zero holdings of stocks are corner solution outcomes where households would 
actually want to go short on stocks, or whether the households are unable to participate in the 
stock market because of, for example, entry costs. For these reasons we use, as our alternative 
approach, the sample selection framework. In this specification, the sample is divided into 
those that participate in the stock market and into those who do not. If participation is 
conditional on some threshold that the households have to overcome before investing in 
stocks is desirable, estimation using only the sample of positive holdings may lead to 
inconsistent estimates if overcoming the threshold and the amount invested are driven by 
same unobservable factors. To overcome this problem, we use the two step method proposed 
by Heckman (1979). We use the probit models in Table 6 to obtain an estimate of the hazard 
rate of participating (so-called inverse Mills’ ratio), and use it as an additional explanatory 
variable in the level regression. Although, the model is identified even if the same variables 
are used in both parts, usually some exclusion restrictions are used to guarantee identification. 
We exclude the urbanization rate variables from the level equation. Thus, we assume that 
once a household has entered the stock market, differences in access to financial services, 
opportunities for social interaction, and knowledge spill-over should not affect the amount 
invested in stocks.  
 
The results for the tobit models are presented in Table 7. We report the marginal effects for 
the observed dependent variable calculated at sample means of the covariates. The results for 
the tobit specification are very similar to the probit results. This gives us some assurance that 
the tobit specification is correct.25 House value has a negative and statistically significant 
effect on the share of financial wealth invested in stocks. Again mortgage debt gets a positive 
sign but the effect is not statistically significant. 
 
                                                 
24 The dependent variable is the euro amount invested in stocks and mutual funds divided by total financial 
wealth. 
25 An informal test for the appropriateness of the tobit specification is that the tobit coefficients should be close 
to the probit coefficients when they are divided by the standard deviation of the error terms in the tobit model.  
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Table 7. Tobit models for the share of risky assets in financial portfolios. 
Marginal Std. Marginal Std. Marginal Std. Marginal Std. 
effect error effect error effect error effect error
i
(i
ncome / 1000 0.0001 0.0005 0.0001 0.0005 -0.0001 0.001 0.0001 0.001
ncome / 1000)2 1.7E-07 2.7E-06 2.5E-07 2.7E-06 2.4E-06 9.6E-06 4.7E-07 2.9E-06
 wealth / 1000 0.001** 4.6E-05 0.001** 4.8E-05 0.001** 0.0001 0.001** 0.0001
(net wealth / 1000)2 -2.0E-07** 3.0E-08 -2.0E-07** 3.0E-08 -2.6E-07** 8.8E-08 -2.0E-07** 3.3E-08
 (ref. < 25) -0.014 0.031 -0.014 0.031 -0.052 0.035 0.100 0.069
-0.049 0.031 -0.048 0.031 -0.067* 0.035 0.014 0.067
-0.044 0.030 -0.042 0.030 -0.077* 0.035 0.045 0.066
-0.053 0.031 -0.051 0.031 -0.088* 0.039 0.036 0.066
   age 65– -0.050 0.033 -0.048 0.033 -0.047 0.051 0.045 0.067
ber of adults -0.010 0.006 -0.010 0.006 -0.014 0.010 -0.008 0.007
ber of children -0.005 0.004 -0.005 0.004 -0.003 0.005 -0.002 0.006
emale household head -0.016* 0.007 -0.016* 0.007 -0.029** 0.011 -0.004 0.009
ation, hh's heada
   education = 1 0.013 0.010 0.013 0.010 0.044** 0.017 -0.009 0.012
ation = 2 0.048** 0.009 0.048** 0.009 0.057** 0.016 0.042** 0.012
ation = 3 0.069** 0.013 0.069** 0.013 0.073** 0.020 0.065** 0.016
ation, others
ation = 1 0.003 0.011 0.003 0.011 -0.021* 0.017 0.023 0.015
   education = 2 0.016 0.014 0.016 0.014 0.000 0.019 0.034* 0.019
ation = 3 0.017 0.020 0.017 0.020 0.020 0.026 0.015 0.031
repreneurb -0.013 0.013 -0.013 0.013 -0.010 0.018 -0.022 0.018
ecutive 0.020 0.013 0.020 0.013 0.021 0.016 0.018 0.020
armer 0.024 0.017 0.025 0.017 0.041 0.031 0.013 0.019
retired -0.001 0.013 -0.001 0.013 0.056* 0.026 -0.017** 0.015
ong-term unemployed 0.045* 0.022 0.046 0.022 0.055 0.040 0.046 0.025
   Inherited fin. wealthc 0.019* 0.008 0.019* 0.008 0.011 0.012 0.022* 0.010
mi-urband -0.022* 0.009 -0.022* 0.009 -0.044** 0.013 -0.007 0.012
-0.010 0.008 -0.010 0.008 -0.035** 0.014 0.007 0.010
house value / 1000 -0.0002* 0.0001 -0.0002** 0.0001 -0.0004** 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001
ortgage / 1000 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002
ensored (0, 1)
gma
OLS R2
og-L
All homeowners All homeowners
0.492 0.492 0.489 0.476
Urbanisation rate dummy variables, reference group is urban areas.
es: Dependent variable is the share of financial assets invested in stocks or mutual funds. Sampling weights 
ed in the estimation. ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1and 5 percent level, respectively. 
Dummy variables for education. Reference group is comprehensive school only. Education of other members 
akes a value of one if there are two or more persons with the particular degree in the household. 1 = high school 
ocational school, 2 = higher vocational, 3 = university degree.
Occupation type dummies, reference group is employees.
Dummy indicating that the household has inherited financial assets in the last five years.
Mortgage > 0 Mortgage = 0
-1 138 -1 137 -503 -1 251
0.16 0.16 0.13 0.22
(749, 4) (919, 6)
2 443 2 443 1 065 1 378
(1 668, 10) (1 668, 10)
net
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This time an interesting thing happens when we divide our sample in two. House value is no 
longer significant for the homeowners without a mortgage. This finding is in line with 
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numerical model since for these households house value cannot exceed net wealth ( 1)h .≤  It 
is somewhat puzzling why we don’t see this already in the probit model. We interpret this as 
evidence in favor of the house price risk story. In other words, the result of the probit model is 
driven by crowding-out but we can see the house price risk at work when we look at the share 
of financial wealth invested in stocks. 
 
Table 8 includes the results for sample selection models where the dependent variable is again 
the share of liquid financial wealth invested in stocks. The results are qualitatively similar to 
the probit and tobit results. House value gets the expected sign but is significant only when 
mortgage debt is controlled. For households with a mortgage, the effect of house value is 
marginally larger than it was for all homeowners but it is not statistically significant. In fact, 
all the coefficients in this model are highly imprecise. Interestingly, for homeowners without 
a mortgage the relationship between house value and stockholding is positive, but not 
significant. This is another indication that it is the leveraged position on owner-occupied 
housing that has an adverse effect on the share of liquid financial wealth invested in stocks. 
We attribute this to hedging against house price risk. Sample selection bias does not seem to 
be a major concern here. The sample selection correction variable is significant only in one of 
our specifications. Furthermore, simple OLS estimates (not reported here) were very similar 
to the ones obtained using the Heckman two-step method.  
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Table 8. Sample selection models for the share of risky assets in financial portfolios. 
Std. Std. Std. St
Coeff. error Coeff. error Coeff. error Coeff. error
d. 
onstant 0.138 0.244 0.156 0.239 0.659 0.216 -0.060 0.351
ncome / 1000 -0.004* 0.002 -0.004* 0.002 -0.004 0.003 -0.004* 0.002
ncome / 1000)2 1.5E-05 8.9E-06 1.6E-05 8.7E-06 6.1E-06 2.6E-05 1.8E-05* 8.6E-06
net wealth / 1000 0.001** 0.0004 0.001** 0.0004 0.0001 0.0006 0.001** 0.0004
 wealth / 1000)2 -5.4E-07** 1.9E-07 -5.2E-07** 1.9E-07 3.6E-07 4.0E-07 -4.8E-07** 1.8E-07
 (ref. < 25) -0.124 0.117 -0.120 0.115 -0.185 0.125 0.308 0.238
-0.272* 0.120 -0.262* 0.118 -0.232 0.131 0.057 0.226
-0.200 0.117 -0.182 0.116 -0.123 0.139 0.178 0.223
   age 55–64 -0.229 0.123 -0.210 0.122 -0.130 0.160 0.171 0.222
-0.272* 0.127 -0.252* 0.125 -0.056 0.184 0.142 0.228
ber of adults -0.066** 0.024 -0.064** 0.024 -0.040 0.040 -0.063** 0.025
ber of children -0.006 0.016 -0.006 0.016 0.033 0.020 -0.006 0.022
emale household head -0.028 0.030 -0.024 0.030 0.047 0.051 -0.012 0.031
education, hh's heada
ation = 1 0.042 0.040 0.038 0.039 0.057 0.069 -0.050 0.044
ation = 2 0.185** 0.050 0.177** 0.049 0.083 0.075 0.138* 0.050
ation = 3 0.235** 0.074 0.225** 0.073 0.077 0.092 0.170* 0.073
ation, others
   education = 1 0.124** 0.045 0.128** 0.045 0.161* 0.069 0.153** 0.053
ation = 2 0.034 0.051 0.033 0.050 -0.061 0.061 0.076* 0.065
ation = 3 0.099 0.065 0.095 0.063 0.040 0.077 0.163 0.087
repreneurb -0.107* 0.047 -0.105* 0.046 0.101 0.068 -0.225** 0.057
ecutive 0.071 0.045 0.070 0.044 0.111* 0.051 -0.021 0.063
farmer -0.024 0.064 -0.023 0.062 -0.084 0.103 -0.046 0.067
ired 0.030 0.049 0.034 0.049 0.079 0.099 -0.046 0.056
ong-term unemployed 0.165 0.090 0.162 0.088 -0.080 0.161 0.193* 0.095
nherited fin. wealthc 0.052 0.033 0.048 0.032 0.009 0.040 0.055 0.038
ue / 1000 -0.00049 0.00028 -0.00055* 0.00028 -0.0006 0.0004 1.6E-06 0.0003
mortgage / 1000 0.0007 0.0006 0.0011 0.0007
nverse mills ratio 0.278* 0.139 0.254 0.137 -0.093 0.146 0.173 0.137
 R2
es: Dependent variable is the share of financial assets invested in stocks or mutual funds. Sampling weights 
are used in the estimation. ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1and 5 percent level, respectively. Standard 
 are calculated using the White method.
a Dummy variables for education. Reference group is comprehensive school only. Education of other members 
akes a value of one if there are two or more persons with the particular degree in the household. 1 = high school 
or vocational school, 2 = higher vocational, 3 = university degree.
Occupation type dummies, reference group is employees.
c Dummy indicating that the household has inherited financial assets in the last five years.
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The empirical results differ considerably from the predictions drawn from the simulation 
model. The most striking difference is the low level of participation. Some of this can be 
explained by adding to the model entry and participation costs and buffer stock saving 
motives. According to our econometric results, owner-occupied housing does offer a partial 
explanation for low levels of stockholding. However, considerable amount of unexplained 
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heterogeneity remains. This is in line with previous empirical findings on household portfolio 
choice from a number of countries.26 Perhaps a partial solution can be traced back to the most 
simple portfolio models where stock holding is driven solely by the degree of risk aversion 
and the expected return of stocks compared to a safe asset. A recent finding by Dominitz and 
Manski (2007) is very interesting in this respect. They report that nearly two-thirds of the 
respondents in the American 2004 Health and Retirement Study report no better than a 50-50 
change of a positive nominal return from the stock market. This means that some households 
may not actually perceive that stocks offer a return premium. Moreover, Dominitz and 
Manski find large heterogeneity in stock market perceptions of the respondents.27 Since a 
necessary condition for a risk-averse individual to invest in stocks (given that the return is 
uncertain) is that the expected return is higher than the safe return, Dominitz and Manski’s 
finding may be valuable for future research.  
 
Some clear patterns do emerge from our models in addition to housing. The levels of net 
wealth and education have a positive effect on both the discrete decision of participating in 
the stock market and the share of financial wealth invested in stocks. Furthermore, households 
living in urban areas are more likely to own stocks and households whose head (household 
head is defined as the person with the highest income in the household) was female were less 
likely to invest in stocks. 
 
4   Conclusions 
 
This paper studied the link between homeownership and household portfolio choice. The 
starting point for the paper was the finding by Flavin and Yamashita (2002) that given the 
historical returns on different assets in the U.S. homeowners with a leveraged position on 
housing should hedge against house price risk by holding fewer stocks. We replicated the 
simulation results using Finnish asset return data and showed that house price risk may indeed 
be an important reason for the low level of stock market investment by Finnish households. 
The main contribution of the paper was to put this prediction into a microeconometric test. 
                                                 
26 See e.g. Guiso et al. (2003) and Curcuru et al. (2005). 
27 Dominitz and Manski (2007) also find that expectations of stock market performance varied systematically 
according respondent’s characteristics. Women are more likely to have more negative attitude towards the 
possibility that stock markets will do well. They also report that expectations clearly varied with age, older 
people being more pessimistic. Furthermore, those respondents who were more pessimistic about stock market 
performance also were less likely to actually hold stocks. 
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Econometric results tell us that owner-occupied housing has two effects on household 
stockholding. First, housing capital simply pushes some homeowners away from the stock 
market altogether because these households do not see it worthwhile to enter the stock market 
given their low level of liquid financial wealth. Second, homeowners with a leveraged 
position on housing hedge against house price risk by holding less stocks than households 
who own their houses outright. What comes to other important factors behind stockholding, 
we find that wealthier and more educated households are clearly more prone to own stocks 
and also invest a larger share of their liquid financial wealth into stocks. However, 
considerable amount of unexplained heterogeneity remains in households’ stockholding 
behavior, both in participation and in the amounts invested. 
 
Some open questions remain for future work concerning housing and financial portfolio 
choice. In a recent paper, Sinai and Souleles (2005) argue that owner-occupied housing 
should not be treated straightforwardly as a simple asset inducing a background risk for 
homeowners. Instead, the asset price risk depends on households expected tenure length and 
moving behavior. An interesting extension in this line of research would be to explicitly 
control for expected tenure length, and interact it with house value. One would also want to 
control for whether a homeowner is expected to move up or down the housing ladder. 
Unfortunately this cannot be done with the current data set and must be left for future work. 
In addition, an interesting future avenue would be to study how households adjust their 
financial portfolios just before and after the purchase of their first owner-occupied dwelling. 
However, this line of research probably requires the use of panel data.  
 
Furthermore, two important institutional changes have occurred in Finland that should also be 
of interest for future research. Namely, new longer maturity mortgages have been introduced 
in Finland only recently. This should have a clear effect on the way households save during 
their life-cycle and on their expected moving frequency, both of which are closely connected 
to portfolio choice. In addition, mutual funds have become available more and more in recent 
years which may induce also lower wealth households to invest in stocks because trough 
mutual funds these households are better able to diversify their risk. Both of these recent 
developments should have a clear effect on household portfolios.  
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Appendix 1. Calculating asset returns for the simulation model. 
 
The return from owner-occupied housing consists of capital gains, the rental value of housing 
services minus the costs of ownership, maintenance and depreciation. We estimate the capital 
gain using a national-level, quality adjusted house price index produced by Statistics Finland.1 
An estimate of the gross rental value of housing services is obtained using the 1998 Wealth 
Survey the following way. Homeowners in the survey were asked an estimate of their current 
house value. Using these values we estimate a hedonic regression to obtain a value for a 
constant quality house.2 From renter households the data includes the rents they paid during 
the survey year. Again we used a hedonic regression to obtain a monthly rent for a constant 
quality dwelling. The annual gross rental return was obtained by dividing the constant quality 
annual rent by house value. This gave us an estimate of 5.2 percent for the average annual 
gross rental return. We assume that this stayed constant during 1995–2005. From this gross 
measure we subtract depreciation and property taxes.3 Unfortunately, there exits no measures 
of depreciation of physical housing stock in Finland, thus, we use a commonly used annual 
rate of 2 percent as our measure.4 The municipal property tax is calculated as the annual 
national average weighted by municipal property values. The imputed rental income is not 
taxed in Finland. Also capital gains are tax-exempt if the owner or her family has used the 
house as their primary home for at least two consecutive years. We assume that this is the 
case and set the tax rate on capital gains from owner-occupied housing to zero.  
 
Stock returns are based on a dividend adjusted stock index of the Helsinki Stock Exchange 
(previously HEX and now OMX Helsinki index). The stock returns are taxed with a 
proportional capital income tax rate which varied from 25 to 29 percent during the research 
period. Government bond return data is obtained from Datastream and includes bonds of all 
maturities. The return to bank accounts is obtained from the statistics services of Bank of 
Finland. We subtract the stamp tax which equals the capital income tax rate from interest and 
government bond returns. Mortgage interest is also obtained from the Bank of Finland and it 
                                                 
1 This approach has its drawbacks because using a nationwide house price index understates the true level of 
uncertainty a homeowner faces by ignoring the idiosyncratic or house specific part of the risk. See e.g. Englund 
et al. (2002). 
2 The housing attributes in the hedonic models included house age and type, living area, building material, 
urbanization rate of the municipality and dummy variables for 77 NUTS 4 regions. 
3 We assume that households spend annually on maintenance an amount that keeps the house in constant 
condition. This way we don’t have to separately account for maintenance costs and depreciation.  
4 See Le Blanc and Lagarenne (2004) among others. 
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equals the average rate on new mortgage contracts. Nominal mortgage interest is tax 
deductible according to a flat rate equal to the capital income tax rate. The cost of living index 
produced by Statistics Finland is used to convert the returns into real terms. 
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Appendix 2. Econometric models using instrumental variables.  
 
In this Appendix, we present some further econometric results using instrumental variable 
techniques. Like we argued in the main text, the reason we are using instrumental variable 
techniques is due to omitted variables, such as risk aversion and credit constraints, not 
simultaneity. For example, if we think of stock- and homeownership as risky investments, 
omitting a measure of risk aversion from the models might lead to a correlation between 
house value and the error term, and to biased and inconsistent estimates. We concentrate on 
house value and omit mortgage from the models. Let y1 indicate stockholding and y2 is house 
value. An instrumental variable probit model can be defined as 
 
    (A1) (1 1i 1 2 11iy yα ε′= + + >z β )0i
2 2 2 ,i i iy ε′= +z β     (A2) 
 
where 1(.) is an indicator function taking the value 1 if the statement in the parenthesis is true 
and 0 otherwise. The vector z includes all exogenous variables including the ones in z1 with 
some elements (the instruments) that are not included in z1. The error terms are assumed to be 
independent of z1 and z, and to follow a bivariate normal distribution with mean zero and 
correlation .ερ  If 0,ερ ≠  y2 is endogenous and the usual univariate probit estimation of (A1) 
leads to inconsistent estimates.1 Similarly, an instrumental variables tobit model with 
censoring at 0 and 1 can be written as 
 
     (A3) 1 1 1 2 1 ,i iy yα∗ ′= + +z β iu
∗ <
2u
                                                
    (A4) 1 1
0,          if   0
,        if  0 1
1,          if   1,
i
i i i
i
y
y y y
y
∗
∗
∗
⎧ ≤⎪= <⎨⎪ ≥⎩
     (A5) 2 2 ,i i iy ′= +z β
 
where  is now a latent variable and y1y
∗
1 its observed continuous counterpart. Again, the error 
terms are assumed to be independent of z1 and z, and to follow a bivariate normal distribution 
 
1 See Wooldridge (2002) pp. 477–478 for details. 
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with correlation .uρ  Both the probit and tobit specifications can be extended to include 
multiple endogenous explanatory variables. The instrumental variable probit and tobit models 
were estimated using the ivprobit and ivtobit maximum likelihood procedures in Stata 9. The 
sample selection model was estimated using 2SLS with the inverse Mills’ ratio (IMR) 
obtained from a probit model as an additional explanatory variable. This method produces 
consistent estimates as long as the first-step probit estimates used to construct the IMR are 
consistent.2 This model is denoted as heckit in Table A1. Finally, we estimate a simple 2SLS 
model using only homeowners with positive stockholdings.  
 
We need an instrument that is correlated with house value but is not correlated with the 
omitted variables in the error term. Obviously, regional housing supply conditions affect the 
housing choices of households, but they should not be correlated with the unobserved 
individual characteristics omitted from our models.3 As our instrument for house value, we 
use the regional price of a constant quality house obtained using hedonic regression 
techniques.4 The idea is that the regional house price level affects the level of the housing 
investment because of consumption demand. The results for the models are presented in Table 
A1. 
 
The results are supportive of our conclusions in the main text. House value gets a negative 
sign in all the models and the effects are larger in absolute terms than in the main text. 
However, house value is not significant in any of the instrumented models. Furthermore, 
exogeneity of house value is not rejected in any of the specifications.5 This gives us some 
assurance that the results in the main text are consistent. The validity of the test depends, of 
course, on the validity of the instrument. The instrument does have good explanatory power, a 
t-ratio of 11.1 in the whole sample of homeowners and 8.0 in the sample with positive 
stockholding.  
                                                 
2 Because exogeneity of house value was not rejected in the ivprobit model, the IMR is constructed using the 
standard probit model not the instrumental variable probit.  
3 Of course, this is true only to the extent that households are not endogenously selected into particular housing 
market regions. 
4 This model was used also in Appendix 1. The housing attributes in the hedonic models included house age and 
type, living area, building material, urbanization rate and dummy variables for 77 NUTS 4 regions. Due to small 
sample size, we assume that the marginal prices are equal across regions and allow the regional prices vary only 
through the intercept. Our instrument gets 77 different values. 
5 Exogeneity is tested in the probit and tobit models using a Wald test where the null hypothesis is that the 
correlation between the error terms is zero. The exogeneity test in the heckit and 2SLS models is the usual 
Hausman test.  
 3
 
Table A1. Instrumental variable models. 
m.e. SE m.e. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
constant 0.044 0.299 0.571 0.098
ncome / 1000 0.008 0.006 0.001 0.002 -0.003 0.002 -0.004** 0.002
ncome / 1000)2 -2.6E-05 3.0E-05 -1.5E-06 1.0E-05 1.4E-05* 6.4E-06 1.8E-05** 5.6E-06
 wealth / 1000 0.006** 0.001 0.002** 0.0005 0.002* 0.0007 0.001** 0.0002
(net wealth / 1000)2 -1.8E-06** 0.0E+00 -8.1E-07** 0.0E+00 -6.2E-07** 2.3E-07 -2.0E-07** 6.8E-08
. < 25) -0.023 0.381 -0.052 0.183 -0.130 0.069 -0.129 0.081
-0.295 0.379 -0.201 0.180 -0.290** 0.083 -0.221** 0.080
-0.331 0.372 -0.194 0.179 -0.219** 0.082 -0.158* 0.079
-0.434 0.381 -0.241 0.182 -0.256** 0.098 -0.168* 0.083
   age 65– -0.321 0.406 -0.204 0.190 -0.295** 0.095 -0.234* 0.101
ber of adults -0.078 0.066 -0.040 0.028 -0.072** 0.024 -0.053* 0.024
ber of children -0.043 0.042 -0.016 0.018 -0.008 0.016 0.008 0.017
emale household head -0.155 0.084 -0.066 0.036 -0.035 0.032 0.000 0.031
ation, hh's heada
   education = 1 0.121 0.116 0.061 0.051 0.049 0.038 0.023 0.046
ation = 2 0.350** 0.110 0.193** 0.049 0.204** 0.064 0.116** 0.041
ation = 3 0.653** 0.147 0.300** 0.060 0.268* 0.100 0.124** 0.048
ation, others
ation = 1 -0.101 0.120 0.004 0.055 0.121** 0.042 0.141** 0.048
   education = 2 0.219 0.157 0.072 0.061 0.042 0.045 -0.008 0.046
ation = 3 0.174 0.209 0.071 0.073 0.106* 0.057 0.088 0.059
repreneurb -0.047 0.135 -0.058 0.053 -0.109* 0.043 -0.098* 0.045
ecutive 0.182 0.143 0.075 0.056 0.076 0.041 0.044 0.045
armer 0.347** 0.131 0.098 0.055 -0.016 0.054 -0.091 0.048
retired -0.051 0.156 -0.018 0.067 0.033 0.045 0.053 0.062
ong-term unemployed 0.335 0.241 0.188 0.119 0.190 0.107 0.111 0.118
nherited fin. wealthc 0.162 0.093 0.073 0.039 0.057* 0.030 0.018 0.034
mi-urband -0.185* 0.093 -0.095* 0.041
-0.115 0.104 -0.056 0.046
house value / 1000 -0.0042 0.003 -0.0018 0.001 -0.0008 0.0007 -0.0006 0.0008
verse mills ratio 0.348 0.206
xogeneity test (Wald)
 stage t-test (p-value)
Log L
0.26 (0.610) 0.49 (0.483) 1.69 (0.999) 0.40 (1.000)
Urbanisation rate dummy variables, reference group is urban areas.
es: Instrumental variable models. Sampling weights are used in the estimation. ** and * indicate statistical 
ignificance at 1and 5 percent level, respectively. 
Occupation type dummies, reference group is employees.
c Dummy indicating that the household has inherited financial assets in the last five years.
Dummy variables for education. Reference group is comprehensive school only. Education of other members takes a 
alue of one if there are two or more persons with the particular degree in the household. 1 = high school or vocational 
chool, 2 = higher vocational, 3 = university degree.
-6 627 460 -6 580 039
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